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In most models of general equilibrium, the technology of
producers is represented by convex production sets (e.g.
Debreu[2] ), which imply increasing marginal cost functions.
Convex production sets or increasing marginal cost functions
permit the definition of supply functions (or correspondences)
and thus an equilibrium may be defined by equating supply and
demand.
In partial analysis.both for competitive and monopolistic
markets,it is often assumed that marginal cost functions
decrease first and then increase ("U shaped curves"), as e.g.
in Chamberlain [ 1] and Shubik [ 9] . Here the solution always
lies in the increasing part of the marginal cost function, a
case also considered in equilibrium theory by Debreu [3] 2),
If however there are increasing returns to scale for any level
of output, so the production sets are not convex and the cost
functions that they imply show decreasing mean
cost for any positíve value of output, then supply functions
are not defined, as was already noted by Sraffa [10] (p, 543)
and Viner [12], since the profit function does not attain a
finite non zero maximum. So equality of supply and demand
cannot be a basis of equilibrium.
One way out is to assume that firms produce differentiated
products with high but finite elasticities of substitution
(see Sraffa [10]). Now each firm is a monopolist for his own
product competing with firms producing close substitutes.
In the present paper however, we construct a partial equilibrium
z)
Part of the research for this paper was done while theauthor was a researchfellow at CORE, Louvain. The authorthanks J. Dalmulder and P. Ruys for their comments.Just before I finished the present paper, I received thebook of Marshak and Selten [5], who in chapter IV considera general equilibrium model with non decreasing returns toscale. Their approach is similar to the one in the presentpaper for the case without selling costs, since theyintroduce fixed market shares.
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model of a market where all firms have decreasing mean cost
functions and produce a single homoqeneous commodity: consumers
consider the products of all firms equivalent.
In this case any producer, who produces at all, will try to
sell as much as possible. Therefore it is necessary to
distribute total demand over producers. In order to do this
the demand schedule is completed by adding a distribution of
market shares to the traditional demand function. We consider
two cases: in the first the shares are given data for each
producer, in the second they may be influenced by selling
activity. The markets considerd in this paper are essentially
n-persons non zero sum games. The equilibrium concept which
is used is the game theoretical concept of Nash Equilibrium
which is a non cooperative solution. It is assumed here that
firms do not consider the effect of their behaviour on their
competitors (apart from the assumption that they do expect
their competttors to follow any price decrease). This may
only be plausible if the number of firms is "large" (whatever
that means). There certainly exist other equilibrium concepts
(cooperative solutions) which might be interesting in the
present case. However the Nash equilibrium approach keeps the
analysis nearest to competitive behaviour of firms with convex
production sets.
But of course the market has also important features of
monopolistic competition since each frim faces a decreasing
demand function. (see Samuelson [61)
It should be pointed out, that the solutions in our market
are not efficient, unless there is only a single firm: if
there are increasing returns to scale the only efficient way
to produce is to have produced all output of a commodity by
one firm. Papers by Scarf [71 and Dierker, Fourgeaud and
Neufeind [4] consider general equilibrium solutions in an
economy with increasing returns, which guarantee efficiency
and which are enforced by some planning mechanism; in these
papers it is assumed that each commodity ís produced by one
firm. A second source of inefficiency are the selling costs,
- 3 -
which are, within the framework of the model below, nothing
but an expensive method to distribute total demand over
producers.
In the first part of the present paper we consider production
and consumption and introduce the concepts necessary in part




Let t~ -{1,2,...,n} be the set of firms that can produce a
certai:~ homogeneous commodity and assume that they all produce
a single commodity using several inputs. Each firm's
technology can be represented by a production set Yi C RR}1;
a typícal element of this set being a vector (yi,zi), where
yi is the quantity produced by i and zi -(zi,zi,...,zi) is
the vector of imputs used to produce yi, hence z ~ 0.
Let (p,q) E R}}1 be a price vector, p being the price of
output and g being the vector of input prices. The number
ni - pyi }`lzi is firm i's profit.
We define i's cost function: fi: RF}1 -. R1, where fi(y,q) is
the minimal cost to produce y at input prices q:
fi(y.q) - min {- c ~ c- qz and (y.z) E Yi}
The following assumptions are standard.
For all i E N:
1 0 E Y.i
2 Yi ~ R}}1 - {p}
3 Rp} ~ C y.- i
4 Y. is closedi
5(Y,z) E Yi and ( Y~~z') ~(Y.z) ~(y'z') E Yi
From these assumptions it directly follows that the cost
function is non-decreasing both in y and q:
Y ? Y~ ~ fi(Y,q) ? fi(y'.q)
q ? q~ ~ fi(Y.q) ~ fi(y~q~)
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We call profítable sales correspondence the correspondence
Hi(p,q), that associates to each price vector the quantities
y of output which are profitable, i.e. no loss is made if they
are sold
Hi(p,q) -{yl~z: ( Y.z) E Yi and py t qz ~ p}
fi(y.q)
- {YIPY - fi(y.4) ? 0} - {YIP ? y }
A firm will only operate if i ts sales are in Hi(p,q).
3. CONVFX PRODUCTION SETS.
If we assume also
assumption C: Yi: Yi is convex, then it is well known that for
a firm maximizing profits a supply correspondence exists.
Let ni(p,q) - max {pyfqzl(y,z) e Yi} be i's profit function.
ni(p,a) is non negative and finite in some closed set Q t RR}1.
The supply correspondence bi: RR}1 -. RQtI.
bi(P.q) -{Y.zIPYfqz - ni(P,q) and (Y.z) E yi}
is non empty, closed and convex valued in Q and it is upper
hemi continuous and compact valued in Int Q.
The first component bi(p,q) represents i's supply of output
at prices (p,q) and for k- 1,2,...,k, - bi(p,q) is i's demand
for inputs. It is non-decreasing in p, for fixed q, in its
first component.
P ' P~ ~ bi(P~q) ? bi(P~.q)
The total supply correspondence b(p,q) - E bi(p,c~) is the
i
aggregate supply of all firms and has the same properties.
The cost function fi(y,q) is convex in y:
afi(y,q) t (1-a)fi(y'q) ~ fi(ay t (1-a)y'.q)
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and we have
ni(p,q) - max (qY - fi(Y.q)1
y? 0
Further the profitable output correspondence contains the
supply correspondence
Hi(P.q) ~ bi(P.q)
and Hi(p,q) is a convex set.
For fixed q, Hi(p,q) c Hi(p,q), if p~ p'; Hi(p,q) is compact
(an interval) if bi(p,q) is compact.
4. INCREASING RETURNS.
In what follows we shall not assume convexity, but we consíder
the case of increasing returns to scale. Therefore, instead
of assumption C, we make the following two assumptions:
6 For all y~ 0: {z~(y,z) E Y.} is convex- i
7 For all a~ 1: (y,z) E Yi ~ 3 Y': y' ~ ay and (Y',az) E Yi
Assumption 6 ensures that the set of inputs, which permit
production of y, is convex. By assumption 7 a proportional
extension of inputs leads to a more than propertional extension
of output. Now a reasonable supply correspondence is no longer
def ined :
for any (p,q) E R~}1, we have either
ni(p.q) - max {PYtqz~(Y,z) E Yi} - 0
or
T~i(p.q) - max {PYtqz~(Y.z) E Yi} - ti
This follows from assumption 7: suppose pytqz - a~ 0, a ~ ti
and (y,z) E Yi; then a(y,z) E Int Yi, hence p(ay) t q(az) -
- 7,a; so a can never be a maximum. This implies that s~
-~-
is either zero or infinite. So equality of supply and demand
in the traditional sense cannot be the basis of an equilibrium.
Because of assumption 6, the cost function exists and also a
demand correspondence for inputs depending on y and q. The
cost function is increasing in y, for q fixed:
fiíy,a) ~ fi(Y~.q) if y~ y~
From assumption 7 it follows that the mean cost function is
decreasing, for q~ 0 fixed:
fi(y,q) fi(y'~q)
y ~-T- i f y~ y~
It is easy to prove, that if f is differentiable, then
~fi(Y~q) fi(Y,q)
ay ~ y for all y
The profitable sales correspondence is well defined for all
p,q. For q fixed and p sufficiently low, that is if
fi(y.4) -
y ~ p, for all y, then Hi(p,q) - 0. For larger values
of p, Hi(p,q) is a convex set bounded below and unbounded
above.
The lower bound of the profitable sales correspondence, we
call
minimum sales function:
hi(p,q) - min {Y~Y E Hi(p,q)}
This function is the inverse of the mean cost function:
fi(y,q)






It is decreasing in p.
A pair (y,p) is feasible if y E Hi(p,q), that is if the y
sold is at least hi(p,q). If p and q are given, then a firm
will only produce a quantity y if
1) he can sell y at price p
2) Y E Hi (p.q)
The firm is willing to sell any quantity of product larger
than hi(p,q): the more he sells at this price, the higher
will be his profit. Since he cannot hope to sell an infinite
quantity, his sales are lower than he would like them to be;
so the problem is, how much can each firm sell at a price p?
Remark
Compare the shape of the profitable sales correspondence in
figure 1, to the shape of this correspondence if the production
set is strictly convex, as is shown in figure 2. Both Hi(p,q)
and the supply function converge to 0, if p converges to some
minimum price p. The minimum sales function is always 0.




5. CONSUMERS AND PRODLJCERS.
The "traditional" theory of consumer choice is only concerned
wíth the question how much a consumer demands and not with
the question from which producer he buys. This approach seems
to be satisfactory if the commodity is produced with decreasing
returns. Assume first that the production sets are strictly
convex. Then the supply correspondence is single valued. So
at each price vector the producer offers some quantity y,inot more and not less, so total supply equals E yi. If
i,preferences are also strictly convex, then demánd x~ of each
consumer and total demand E xj are also single valued and at
an equilibrium price we have by definition Ex~(p) - Eyi(p).
At this equilibrium price each consumer will be able, possibly
after some search, to find a producer who is willing to sell
the required quantity. The consumer might first address to a
firm which has already sold out, then he will look for another
one. Each producer will be able to find consumers who are
willing to buy and the market will clear. Things are slightly
more complex if production sets or preferences are convex but
not strictly convex, but not essentially different.
If however all production sets are as described in the previous
section, so that increasing returns appear at any level of
production, then things become completely different. At a given
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price vector each producer has first to decide if he will
produce at all. He will not produce if the cannot sell at least
his minimum sales hi(p,q). If he decides to produce, he will try
to sell as much as possible. So if a consumer directs himself
to such a producer, he will always be served. Therefore it
becomes necessary to determine how consumers choose their seller,
i.e. to which firm they address first. We want to keep the
theory as simple as possible and similar to the theory with
decreasing returns. Therefore we assume that each consumer
determines the quantity demanded only by considering prices
and not by considering sellers, so that traditional demand
theory remains the basis of individual and total demand. This
implies that each consumer will determine his demand by
considering the price raised by the cheapest producer and he
will only buy from a producer raising this lowest price. Hence
all producers must ask the same price; a more expensive
producer will not sell anything.
This also implies that any producer has the possibility to
lower the market price. His competitors will have to follow
him, if not they loose all their sales. Increasing the price
however is only possible by cooperative action of all sellers.
Hence each individual firm faces a"kinked demand function"
(see [ 11] ) .
The consumers should choose their seller among the producers
asking the same price. Different assumptions about their
behaviour are possible, e.g.
- The consumer has no preference at all for any seller. Buying
from i or j is a choice between indifferent alternatives.
So the choice will be random or guided by some conscient or
inconscient mechanism.
- The consumer has certain preferences for producers, but these
preferences are lexicographically related to the preferences
for commodities; his preferences among sellers are so to say
"second order preferences", or to make this more precise:
if xk~ is the quantity of the k-th commodity bought from
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the j-th firm, then there are three preference relations:
~1 amoung bundles of the type (Exk )
J ~
~2 amoung bundles of the type (xkj)
and an overall preference relation ~, such thatti
x~ x' p x~ x'i or x til x and x ~ x'z
Both approaches leave open the possibility that the consumer's
decisions with respect to sellers can be influenced by selling
activities of the producers, as advertising, the sending around
of salesman, giving premiums to shopkeepers, etc. It seems
reasonable to assume that consumers may be easily persuaded to
make a particular choice, if this choice is considered to be
equivalent to other alternatives, and that a(weak) preference
for one firm over another could be easily inverted.
We shall not explore this question further with respect to
individual consumers, but attack the question more globally
and consider only the aggregate behaviour of consumers.
Therefore we introduce the concept of the market share of firm
i. The market share pi is the fraction of total demand x(p,q),
where x(p,q) is the traditional demand function, that is
addressed to firm i. So i's sales yi are egual to pix(p,q).
The fraction pi may be depend on any variable in the economy.
We shall assume that it only depends on two factors:
- the producers who are in the market
- the selling activity of each producer in the market.
6. MARKET SHARE DISTRIBUTIONS.
N-{1,2,...,n} i s the set of firms that can produce a certain
commodity with increasing returns to scale.
We first consider the case where selling costs do not exist.
So the firms have only to decide to produce or not. Let
a E{0,1}n be the vector of activity indices, with components
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0 and 1. ai - 1 means that firm 1 will produce and consequently
sell as much as possible at the going price p(he is an active
producer) and ai - 0 means that i does not produce (he is
sleeping).
Notatxon.
We define a - (a ,a ,...,a ) - ( a ,á.), where á -1 2 n i ~ iti-(a1,a2,...,ai-l,aitl,...,an), so ai is the vector of
activity indices of all firms, except i.
Definition 6.1
If there i s no selling activity possible, a market share
distribution is a mapping p: {~,1}n -~ [0,1]n ~ R}, where pi(a)
is i's market share and
(1) 0 ~ pi(a) ~ 1
(2) Pi(a) - 0 if ai - 0
(3) Epi(a) - 1 if a~ 0
We assume for this case that the share of each active firm
(strictly) decreases if the set of active firms increases,
i.e. if a new active firm enters:
ASSUMPTION M 0 pi(l,ái) ~ pi(l,ái) if ái ~ ái
An example of such a distribution is
a.i
Eá.J
where all active producers have the same share, e.g. because
there are many consumers who choose randomly 1).
a.
3) Marshak and Selten [5] use the function pi - fá, where the
ai are given positive numbers. i
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Next we consíder the case where selling costs are possible.
Let si denote firm i's selling expenses and vi -(ai~si) E Vi -
-{0,1} X R} denotes the combination of i's activity index
and his selling expenses (obviously ai - 0 and si ~ 0 which
is not excluded formally, cannot be a rational decision). The
vector v F({0,1} X R})n denotes the decision taken by all n
firms.
Notation.
tiWe define v-(v1,v2,...,vn) -( vi,vi), where bytiv. -(vl,vZ,...,vi-l,vi}I,...,vn). We also write v- ( ai,si,vi) -i ti ti -
- (ai,si.ai.si).
Definition 6.2
If there are selling activities, a market share distribution is
a mapping p: V i[0,1]n, where V-({0,1} X Rt)n, such that
(1) 0 ~ pi(v) ~ 1
(2) pi(v) - 0 if ai - 0
(3) Epi(v) - 1 if a~ 0
We assume: (M1) The share of each active firm does not increase
if the set of active firms increases (it is not assumed that
it increases, for, if the j-th firm becomes active, without
havíng a positive amount of selling costs, it does not
necessarily get a non-zero share). (M2) The share of firm i
does not increase if the j-th firm increases its selling
expenses. (M3) Selling costs are effective below a certain
level, i.e. by an increase of its selling expenses a firm
increases its market share at least within some interval, but
it remains possible that at some level an increase is not
effective. (M4) Requires that if this occurs, there is a
satiation level of sellina costs: below this level an increase
is effective, but not above this level. This is illustrated in
- 14 -
figures 3a and 3b. (M5) Finally it is assumed that the market
share is twice differentiable (hence continuous) with respect









Figure 3a Figure 3b
Assumptions
M 1 ti ti ti ti ti tipi(l,si,ai,si) ? pi(l,si,ai,si) if ai ~ ai
M 2 pi(l,si,ái,si) ? pi(i,si,ái,si) if si ~ si
DI 3 For any vi there exist si and si, where si ~ si,
such that pi(l,si,vi) ~ pi(l,si,vi)
M 4 If pi(l,si,vi) - pi(l,si,vi) and si ~ si, then for all
~~ ~ ~
si s si ti tipi(l,si,vi) - Pi(l,si,vi)
M S pi(l,si,ái,si) is twice differentiable with respect
to si and sj (j ~ i) .




In this case a does not explicitely occur: if si - 0, the
market share is 0 and hence ai - 0.
A similar function is used by Schmalensee [8] for market shares
with respect to advertising.
Remark
In the same way as fi(y,q) is the cost function, assuming
an optimal choice of technology, the amount si is assumed to
be allocated in such a way among different selling activities,
that its effect on pi is maximal.
Let for given values of vi
pi(vi) - pi(1,O,~i) - min {pi(l,si,vi)~si ~ 0}
and
Piup(vi) - sup {pi(l,si,vi~si ~ 0}
sup '~~pi (vi) exists since the market shares are non-negative and
bounded above. The share attains its minimum at si - 0,
because of assumptions M 3 and M 5. If there does not exist
a satiation level for selling costs, then the market share
is increasing for all positive si and this implies that the
supremum is not attained (see f ig. 3b), hence if si -} ti, then
ti sup tiPi(l,si,vi) i pi (vi). If there exists a satiation level,
then the supremum is attained for any amount of selling
expenses above the satiation level (see fig. 3a). So we have
Property 6.3
(1) If as, pi(l,si,vi) ~ 0 for all si ~ 0, then
i -
si -, ti ~ pi(l,si,~i) -~ piup(~i)
a ti(2) If there exists si such that as. Pi(1'si'vi) - 0, then
i
pi(l~si,~i) - Piup(~i) for all si ~ si
- 16 -
For given values of vi, the selling costs can be expressed as
a function of firm i's market share.
ti su tiThe function gi(.,vi) maps the interval {p1~0 ~ pi ~ pi p(vi)}
into R}:
gi(Pi.vi) - min {si~pi(l,si,vi) ~ pi}
Since the market share is an increasing function of the
selling costs, for si positive and below the satiation level,
the selling cost function gi is also increasing for
pi(vi) ~ pi ~ Piup(vi) and has value zero for all pi ~ pi(~i)'
If a satiation level exists, then gi attains this level at
piup(v ) if not then gi increases indefinitely if pi converges





Figure 4a Figure 4b
(1) gi(pi.~i) - 0 if pi ~ pi(vi)
(2) gi(pi'vi) is strictly increasing if pi(vi) ~ pi ~ piup(~i)
(3) gi is twice differentiable if Pi(~i) ~ pi ~ Piup(~i)
- ]7 -
(4) if piup(vi) - max pi(l,si,vi), then gi(Pi,vi) ~ ti
s.i
(5) otherwise pi -~ Piup(~i) ~ gi(Pi'yi) i~
PART II NASH E(iUILIBRIA IN A MARKET FOR A COMMODITY PRODUCED
WITH INCREASING RETURNS.
7. ASSUMPTIONS.
N-{1,2,...,n} is the set of firms that can produce a certain
commodity. Prices q of all other commodities in the economy
are kept fixed.
The cost function of the i'th firm is fi(y) (instead of fi(y,q)).
Demand is given by:
- a total demand function x(p) (instead of x(p,q))
- a market share distribution p.(v).i
The cost functions fi(y ) are assumed to be increasing, continuous
and twice differentiable for y~ 0, both mean and marginal
costs are decreasing and mean costs converge to some positive
number ci.
Assumptions on fi(y), ( for all i E N)
C 1 y~ 0~ fi(y) ~ 0; fi(0) - 0
C 2 y~ y' ~ fi (y) ' fi (y~ )
C 3 fi is twice differentiable for y~ 0(hence continuous)
f . (Y) f (y' )
C 4 Y' Y~ ~ 1 ~ iT-Y Y
df.(y) df.(y')
C 5 y~ y~ y 1 ~ 1dy dy
C 6 there exist ci ~ 0, such that, for all y
fi (y) f . (y)
y ~ c. and y-~ ti~ ly -, cii
- 18 -
The demand function is assumed to be of a classical type:
decreasing, twice differentiable and such that total revenue
px(p) first increases with p, then attains a sin le maximum
and then decreases.
Assumptions on x(p)
D 1 p~ 0~ x(p) ~ 0
D 2 p~ p' ~ x(p) ~ x(p')
D 3 x(p) is twice differentiable for p~ 0(hence continuous)
D 4 there exists po ~ 0, such that: p~ po p pox(pa) ~ px(p)
p ~ p o ~ d Pá~ ~ 0 and p~ p o ~ d dx~ ~ 0
Further we assume that for high prices production is not
profitable for any firm, because demand becomes too low.
Assumption E There exist a price r, such that x(r) ~ 0 for
all i: p~ r~ px(p) ~ fi(x(p)) or x(p) - 0.
The assumptions on the market share distributions are given
in section 6.
8. MONOPOLY PRICES
We define the set P as the set of prices such that demand is
positive:
P - {p~x(p) ~ 0}
By assumption D 2, P is an interval.
Further Pi is defined to be the set of prices at which there
exists some profitable non-zero output for firm i:
Pi - {PIH(p) ~ {0}} - {PIP ~ ci}
the equality following from assumption C 6. It proves that Pi
- ]9 -
is an open half line. Pi is independent of the demand function.
Given the demand function, the set of profitable rices of
firm i at share pi ~ 0, is defined
Pi(pi) -{p~oix(P) ~ hi(p), p E P n Pi}.
hi (p)
-{PI pi ? x(p) ~ P E P n Pi} -
h. (p)
Now X(p) is i 's minimum profitable market share.
h. (p)From assumptions C 6 and E it follows, that x( ) ~ 1~ pi
Pfor small values of p and for large values of p(provided that
pi ~ p ~ f~):




- if p? r, then by assumption E, px(p) ~ fi(x(p)) or equivalently,
hi(p) ' x(P).
By the continuity of hi(p) and x(p) it follows that Pi(pi)
is a compact set with Pi(pi) c pi. Note that Pi(pi) needs
not be an interval and that it may be empty. Let i 's (gross)
profit function be
ni(pi,P) - Ppix(P) - fi(pix(P))
Then p(pi) is i's most profitable price at share pi, if
ni(Pi,P(Pi)) - max {ni(pi~p)~p E Pi(pi)}
If i would have the right to fix a price, also binding for
his competitors, he would fix this price. He then behaves
as a monopolist facing the demand function pix(p).
Therefore we call p(pi) also i's monopoly price at share pi.
If a maximum price p is given, then the set
- 20 -
Pi(Pi,P) - Pi(Pi) n {PIP ~ P}
is the set of profitable priced permitted. We define p(pi,p)
as the most profitable price in Pi(pi'P)
ni(Pi,P(Pi,P)) - max {ni(Pi,P)IP E Pi(Pi,P)}
We call p(pi,p) i's restricted monopoly price at share pi
and price restriction p because a firm facing the demand
function pix(p) and the maximum price p, would fix this price.
Prices p(pi) and p(pi,p) respectively, exist if and only if
the sets Pi(pi) and Pi(pi,p) are non empty. (By assumption
D 4, the profit function is bounded above). Obviously we have,
if the monopoly prices exist,
ci ~ P(Pi,P) ~ P(Pi) ~ r
The monopolv price p(pi) needs not be unique.
Besides this the profit function ~rti(pi,p) could have different
local maxima.
Assume however
(F) In the interval Pi ~ pi ~ pi' Pi(pi) ~~ and the profit
function ni has a single maximum p(pi) andan. an.~aP ~ 0 for p ~ p(Pi) and aP ~ 0 for p~ p(Pi)
PROPOSITION
If (F) holds, then Pi ~ Pi ~ pi~ pi implies p(pi) ~ p(pi)
Proof
Profits as a function of total output are
~i(Pi,P(x)) - PiP(x)x - f(pix)
a ~r .
The maximum is attained for áyl - 0, hence
pi(p'(x)x t p(x) - f'(Pix)) - 0
Pi ~ Pi ~ f' (Pix) ~ f' (Pix) ~ or
p'x t p- f'(px) ~ p'x t p- f'(pix), hence
if p'(x)x t p(x) - f'(px) - 0- p'(x)x f p(x) - f'(px)
then x ~ x, hence p(x) ~ p(x).
So the monopoly price decreases if the market share increases.
Provided that assumption (F) holds there, it will be lowest






9. MARKET E(iUILIBRIUM WITHOUT SFLLING COSTS.
The market is defined by
- the set N of producers
- eacli producers cost function fi(yi)
- the total demand function x(p)
- the market share distribution pi(a)
To each producer the prevailing market price g and the
activity indices ái of the others, are given.
The producer is maximizing profits and he has to decide on
two things:
- 22 -
1) participate in the market or not
2) accept the prevailing price or lower it.
The profit function of firm i is ni(pi(a),p) -
~Ti(a~p) - ppi(a)x(p) - fi(pi(a)x(p))
Definition 9.1
An individual optimum for firm i, given p and ái, is a price
p ~ p and ai E{0,1}, such that
~i(ài,ái,P) ? ~i(ai,ái,p)
for all ai E{0,1} and p ~ p.
Firm i will choose ai - 1, if for some p z p, ni(l,ái,p) ~ 0,
or equivalently, if int Pi(pi,p) ~ p1. In this case the
individual optimum will be the pair (l,p), where p is the
restricted monopoly price p(pi(l,ái),p).
Firm i will choose ai - 0, if for all p ~ p, ~ri(l,ái,p) ~ 0,
or e uivalentl if P( ~q y i pi,p) -~. The optimum solutions are
then all pairs (o,p), such that p ~ p. If his best result at
ai - 1 is zero, then both the solutions (l,pi(pi(l,ái),p))
and (o,p) for p ~ p are individual optima.
Definition 9.2
For the market, a feasible solution is a pair (a,p) such that
tii E N: ~ri (a,p) ~ 0 and a~ 0
or equivalently, Ki e N: ai - 1~ pi(a)x(p) ~ hi(p)
Definition 9.3
A pair (à,p) is a Nash equilibrium if (à,p) is feasibl~e and




So in a Nash equilibrium we have
ti ti
tii: ni(ai,ai,P) ~ ni(ai,ai,p) for all ai e{p,l}, p ~ p,
Therefore for all active firms, the price p must be the
restricted monopoly price for share pi(á) and price restriction
P- P - P(Pi(á).P).
This means, if ái - 1,
ti ti




and if ai - 0
ti
ni(l,ái,p) ~ 0 for all p ~ p
ti
so for all p ~ p: pi(l,ái)x(p) ~ hi(p).
So in a Nash equilibrium no active producer has an incentive
to sleep in or to lower the price and no sleeping producer has
an incentive to enter the market.
There are different Nash equilibria, with different sets of
active producers and different prices. One solution certainly
exists if the set of feasible solutions is not empty: the
monopolistic solution where there i s only one active firm.
Proposition 9.4
If the set of feasible solutions is not empty, then there
exists at least one N.E.
Proof Since the set of feasible solutions is not empty,
for some i, there exist pi, such that pi(pi) ~~
and so also Pi(1) ~~. Let A-{1lpi(1) ~ fó},
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Choose p- min {q~q E v Pi(1)} and let p E Pi (1).
A o
Then the solution (a,p) where ái - 1 and
0
ái - 0 if i~ io, is a N.E.:~ri (1,G,p) - 0,
ti o
p- p(l,p), whereas ~ri(l,à,p) ~ 0 for ar.y p ~ p
This needs not be the only solution with io as the only active
producer. There may exist prices p~ p, such that (à,p) is an
equilibrium (with ai - 1 and àj - 0 if j~ io).
0
Being a monopolist, firm io could increase his price so much
that the attracts outsiders, i.e. such that for some
il, ~1(l,àl,p) ~ 0 for some p ~ p. Similary if (à,p) is an
equilibrium with two active firms, (a,p) with p~ p may also
be an equilibrium, whereas at prices p~ p new firms will be
attracted. Etc.
In the next section we shall explore the set of solutions for
a particular case.
Before we do this, we first consider the case where prices
are fixed from the outside. Then the firm has only to decide
if it will produce or not, but it cannot lower the price.
Now a feasible solution is a vector a, such thatti
~ri(ài,ai,p) ~ 0 for all i. A feasible solution a is a N.E. if
ti
~i(l,ài) ~ 0 ~ ai - 1
Obviously the set of feasible solutions at a given price is
a subset of the total set of feasible solutions. If (à,p) is
a N.F. at free prices, then a is also a N.E. for the price p
fixed, but not conversely if à is a N.E. at fixed price p,
it remains possible, that for some i and for some p ~ p
ti
~i(1,ài,P) ~ ni(á,P)
Such a fixed price could be determined by the government, or
by suppliers (resale price maintenance). Suppose however, that
the active producers have collectively the right to determine
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a(minimum) price. Then it might occur that (á,p) is a feasible
solution, where p is not higher than the lowest monopoly price
of the active firms at shares pi(a). So no active firm is
interested in a price decrease. However it is possible that
no sleeping firm could profitably enter the market at p, but
some firm could at a price p ~ p, hence for the sleeping firm j
ti ti
nj (l,aj,p) ~ 0 and ~rj (l,aj,p) ~ 0
(in example 1 below this is true for prices larger than 7,3).
REMARK
However each producer faces a decreasing demand function, and
is a"monopolist" in that sense, he is not assumed to behave
as a monopolist or oligopolist in any other sense. So he is
not assumed to take into account reactions of his competitors
on his own decisions.
Consider the following case: (a,p) is a N.E. Hence for firm i,
profits are not higher at any p ~ p, given i's share pi(á).
At some price p ~ p, firm j would leave the market and at the
new a, firm i's profit would be higher.
In the present model firm i does not consider this possibility.
Also all kinds of cooperative behaviour are excluded.
10. IDENTICAL PRODUCERS.
Assume that all firms have the same cost function f(yi) and
that the market share distribution is given by p(a) -~á , i.e.
all active producers have the same market share. i
Ii any feasible solution we should have p E Pi(~ái), hence
Eái x(P) - P(a)x(p) ? h(P).
Hence Eai ~ hx-~- and h~~ is the maximum number of firms that
might operate in the market at no loss (where h(p) - hi(p)).
We define the function U: P n pi i R, where P and Pi are as
defined in section 8(Pi is identical for all firms)
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u (P) - x~~h(p)
Since u~p) - hX~-~ is i's minimum profitable market share,
u(p) is smaller than 1 for small and for large values of p,
as was shown in section 8; the set
{p~u(p) ~ 1 and pE P ~ Pi} - Pi(1)
certainly contains a global maximum
u(p) - max {u(p)~p E Pi(1) - u(p)}
Case I: p is fixed from the outside.
In this case the solution is very simple. Let m be the number
of active firms m- Eai, so m is a positive integer.
Proposition 10.1
a is a Nash equilibrium for fixed price p if and only if, for
m - Eai,
m ~ min {U(p),n} ~ m f 1
This result is obvious. The number of active firms cannot
exceed the total number of firms n. The maximum number of
firms that may operate without loss is not larger than u(p),
whereas, if m t 1 ~ u(p), then another firm could profitably
enter the market.
If m ~ u(p), then all firms make some profit, since in that
case m px(p) - f(m x(p)) ~ 0.
If m- u(p), then all firms make zero profits.
If u(p) is an integer, then there are two solutions: m- u(p)
with zero profits for all, and m- u(p) - 1 with some profit
for all active firms. For all integers 1 ~ m ~}i, there exists
a price such that there is "room" in the market for exactly
that number of firms.
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Case II: free prices
In this case each firm has the possibility to decrease the
price. For (a,p) to be a N.E., it is required
1) As in case I, each firm makes a non zero profit and no
firm can profitably enter the market, hence
m ~ min {u (p) ,n} ~ m f 1
2) No active firm can raise his profit by a price decrease,
hence
(i) for p ~ p: ~r (m x(P) ) ~~r (m x(p) )
This particularly implies, because of differentiability of
the profit function:
dn.
d 1 ~ 0P -
which ensures that p is a local optimum.
In the profit function has a single maximum, then this is
also a sufficient condition for (i) to be fullfilled.
3) No sleeping producer can profitably enter the market at a
price p ~ p. This requires that no p ~ p exists, such that
u(p) ~ m t 1. From this it directly follows, that no p can
be an equilibrium price if there exists p ~ p with
u tp) ~ u(p) f 1.
So we have
Proposition 10.2
A pair (a,p) is a N.E., if and only if, for m- Eá
(1) m ~ min {u(p),n) ~ m f 1
(2) p- p(m,p), the restricted monopoly price at share m and
price restriction p
-2a-












Let u- max u(p). Then for all a E{0,1}n,for which Eai ~ u,
there exist p such that (a,p) is a N.E.
Proof: Let m be the largest whole number such that m ~ u.
Define Tk -{pIu(p) ~ k} for k- 1,2,...,m.
Then T~ T ~...~ T.., and the set of feasible1 2 m
solutions is F-{(a,p)IEai - k, p E Tk, k- 1,2,...,m}
Define Sk -{PIP E Tk, q ~ P p u(q) ~ ktl, P ~ P(k)}
Now
E-{(a~P)IEai - k, p E Sk and k- 1,2,...,m}
it fullfills 1 of property 3.2.1, since Eai - k ~ u(p);
it fullfills 2, because p is the restricted monopoly
price at share k and restriction p and it fullfills 3,
because for no q ~ p, u(q) ~ k t 1.
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EXAMPLE 1
Identical firms; no selling activity;
demand function: x- 10 - p;
cost function: f(yi) - ~;
hence hi(p) - PZ and u(p) -(lO8p)p2 ;
marginal profits ni(p) - m(10 - 2p t lOm );
P
Fixed prices: for p ~ 0,9, u(p) ~ 1. Hence for 0,9 ~ p ~ 10,
m is the smallest whole number below u(p).
The number of firms first increases with p and then decreases
as is depicted in fig. 7. Some of the solutions are given in
table I.
Free prices: The set of solutions is
{m,p~0,9 ~ p ~ 6,64 and m ~ u(p) ~ m t 1}
For p~ 6,64, n'(p) ~ 0(i.e. the effect of a price increase
is negative, hence the effect of a price decrease is positive).
Figure 7 gives the number of firms in relation to the prices.
Some of the solutions are given in table I.
TABLE I p x u(p) m Yi n'
1 9 lé 1 9 ~ 0
2 8 4 4 2 ~ 0
3 7 7é ~ 1 ~ 0
4 6 12 12 2 ~ 0
5 5 15é 15 3 ~ 0
6 4 18 lg ~ ~ 0
6,64 3,36 18,51 lg 0,19 ~ 0
7 3 18é 18 ~- ~ 0ie
8 2 16 16 é ~ 0

















11. MARKET EC~UILIBRIUM WITH SELLING COSTS.
10
P
The market is defined by
- The set of producers N-{1,2,...,n}
- Each producer's cost function fi(y)
- The total demand function x(p)
- The market share distribution pi(v)
To each producer the prevailing market price p is given, and
the activity indices ái and the selling expenses si of the
others, are given. ( Remember that vi -(ai,si) and v-(vi,vi)).
The producer is maximizing his profit and has to decide on
three things:
1) participate in the market or not: ai is 0 or 1;
2) fix the amount of selling costs si;
3) accept the prevaíling market price or lower it to its
optimal value.
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Let the producers gross profits be
ni(ai.s1.vi.P) - PPi(ai,si,vi)x(P) - fi(Pi(ai,si,vi)x(P))
whereas net profits are gross profits minus selling costs si,
denoted by ~i are
ti ti~i(ai.si,vi.P) - ni(ai,si.vi.P) - si
Definition 11.1
An individual optimum for firm i , given p, and vi is a price
tip ~ p, si ~ 0 and ai E{0,1} such that
~i(ai,si.vi.P) - max {~i(ai,si,vi.P)~ai E{0,1} si i D, P ~ P}
Note that if ái - 0, si - 0 and p may have any value p ~ p.
Definition 11.2
A feasible solution for the market is a pair (v,p) such that
ái - 1 ~ ~i(v,P) ? 0.
Definition 11.3
A Nash Equilibrium is a pair (v,p) such that ~(v,p) is feasible
and (ái,si,p) is an individual optimum given vi and p.
So in a-Nash Equilibrium, if ái - 1, ~i attains a maximum at
si and p. If ái - 0, ~i is nowhere strictly positive. At his
market share pi - pi(v), the price p is i's restricted
monopoly price p(pi,p): given pi and hence si, both i's gross
profits and his net profits are maximum at p.
If the price is given from the outside, the firm has only to
choose ai and si. Then v~is a N.E. for fixed p if, for each i,
~i(v.P) - max {~i(ai~si,vi.P)~ai E {0,1}, si ~ 0}.
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Obviously a N.E. (v,p) is also N.E. (v) for p fixed. The
converse is not true.
Gross profits can also be expressed in terms of the market
share pi, with the help of the selling cost function as defined
in section 6. Replacing si by pi in the profít function, we
get
~i(ai,Pi.~i.P) - aiLPPix(p) - fi(pix(p)) - gi(Pi~ví)J
This profit function is defined for pi, such that
o `L
Pi(vi) ~ pi ~ piup(~i) (see section 6)
Let M be a real number such that M~ max px(p) - pox(po) by
p~0
assumption D 4, and pM(vi) - pi(1,M,vi) ~ piup(vi) then we may
require pi(vi) ~ pi ~ pM(vi): for larger-values of pi the
selling costs are at least M, so profits are negative at
ai - 1. This cannot give an optimal solution.
In an individual optimum (vi,p) given (vi,p) we must have:
~i(ai.Pi.~i,P) - max {~i(ai,pi,~i,p)}~ai E {p,l},
pi(vi) ~ Pi ~ Pi(vi), P ~ P}
This maximum always exists:
The function
PPix(p) - fi(Pix(p)) - 9i(pi,~i)
is continuous on the compact set
{(P,Pi)~0 ~ p ~ p and pi(vi) ~ pi ~ pM(vi)}
so it has a maximum. If this maximum is negative than the
profit function i s maximum for ai - 0. If the maximum is
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non-negative and attained at (pi,p), then (vi,p) is an
tiindividual optimum with ái - 1 and si - gi(pi'~i)'
If ai - 1, we have in this optimum:
I the optimum price p- pi(pi), i. e. the optimum price is the
restricted monopoly price, as in the case of no selling
costs. This is so because for pi fixed, the marginal profit
does not depend on the selling costs. Obviously the
restricted monopoly price only gives an optimum if net
profits exceed selling costs.
II For p fixed, the profit function attains its maximum at p,i
(1) if pi - pM(vi), then si - gi(pi'vi) ~ M, since ~i ~ 0;
hence si is i's satiation level of selling costs at vi;
(2) if pi ~ pM(vi), then the total cost function fi t gi
must be locally concave with respect to pi at pi. This
type of solution certainly occurs if there does not
exist a satiation level of selling costs.
By adding production costs and selling costs, and substituting
yix( ) for pi, we get the total cost function of sales:P
ki(Yi.~i.P) - fi(yi) t gi(xP,vi)
(for 0 ~ Yi ~ pMx(p)).
At a given price p the optimum is attained at a point where
the total cost function is locally convex.
A particularly interesting case occurs, if the total cost
function is convex in some interval yi ~ yi ~ pMx(p). This
could happen if the selling cost function is completely convex,
or convex from a certain level of sales, and its convexity
compensates the concavity of the production costs.
This requires that marginal selling costs are increasing and
become more and more increasing ( or equivalently, that the
marginal effectiveness of selling costs is more and more





Then the total marginal and mean cost functions are "U-shaped",
which brings us back to the traditional case however with price
and decisions of other firms appearing in the cost function.
12. IDENTICAL PRODUCERS.
Assume that all firms have the same cost function f(y) and that
the market share is proportional to each producer's selling
costs (see section 6).
s
(12.1) pi - s tS, for si ~ 0 and Si - E sj ? 0i i - j~i
This function is twice differentiable and we have
(12.2) apiasi
Si BZpi -2Si
~ 0; - ~ 0(sitSi)2 8si (sitSi)3
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aPi si azPi 2s
- - ~ ~; - i ~ 0as~ - (si}Si)z a s] (si}Si)3
so the share is a concave function in si( for Si fixed).
The selling cost function becomes
Y.(12.3) si - 9i(si,Si,P) - x(p~-y Si for 0 ~ Yi ~ x(p)i - -
and we have
z8si x-S , O. a si 2x S~ ~,aYi - (x-yl)z i ayi - (x-yi)3 1
so the selling cost function is strictly convex.




~i - pyi - f(yi) - x-i Si for 0 ~ yi ~ y(p)yi -
Production costs and selling costs are complementary.
Maximization of ~i gives
(12.5) p- f'(Y,) - x S- 0
1 (x-yi)z i
If m is the number of active producers, and we consider
solutions identical for all active producers, then y- myi
and Si - (m-1)si hence
my.
p - f' (y ) - 1 (m-1)s - 0
i (m-1)Zyi i
or
(12.6) si - mml(p-f'(Yi))
Because ~ ~ 0i -
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(12.7) PYi - f(yi) - mml(p-f'(yi))yi ~ 0
or
1




m ~ f(y )
i - f' (Yi)
yi
where yi - mx(p)
So (12.8) shows that the number of active producers will be
equal to the largest whole number, which is smaller than the
quotient of price minus marginal cost and mean cost minus
marginal cost. Each firm's output equals yi and total output
is x(p) - myi.
Each firm spends from his gross profits pyi - f(yi), the amount
mml(p-f~(yi))yi on selling cost. So most of gross profits are




1) The solution considered above is a symmetric one, all firms
having the same output. However non-symmetric solutions are
also possible as is shown by example 3.
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2) The solution holds for p fixed. It will also be a solution
for variable p, if p- P(pi(si)'p)'
Case II: Free price
The optimum must fullfill two conditions.
(i) si must be such that it is optimal for Si, given p
(ii) p must be such that it is optimum for given p-
si
From pi - ss}S it follows si - lpi Si
1 i pi
The profit function is
(12.9) ~(Pi,Si.P) - PYi - f(yi) - si
P.
- PPix(p) - f(Pix(P)) - 1-p Si
i
Differentiation with respect to pi and p gives
a~i(12.10) ap - ÍP-f'(Pix(P)))x - 1 ZSi - 0
i (1-p)
(12 11) a~i - Pi{x t p-f'(Pix) áP} ? 0~ aP
i sitSi
(? 0, since p is only flexible below)
(12.i1) is the formula to express a monopoly solution, so its
solution must be the restricted monopoly price p(pi,p) - p.
Instead of (12.10) and (12.11) we may write
(12.12) (1-p)2 -
Si
g-~(pix) x and x f p-f'(pix) áP ? 0
As in the case of fixed prices, equilibrium selling costs are
(in the symmetric solution):
si - mml(p-f'(mx))Yi
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with the condition that
dx -x -x
dn ~ p-f'(Pix) - p-f,(mx)
which implies that p is the restricted monopoly price.
EXAMPLE 2.
Identical firms; with selling activity; demand function:
x- A-Bx, A~ 0, B~ 0; cost function: f(yi) - at8yi.
I Price fixed.
By (11.8)
f'p- yi P-R (P-S)x
m c f(yi) , - a~x - amf (y ) mYi - i 1 - S
mx
hence
m2 ~ ~S!x - v (p)
If we choose the parameters as indicated in table II, then m
is at most 50, which number is attained at a price 500,5.
For lower prices and for higher prices m is lower. Zf the price
decreases to 10.5, the number of firms is equal to 9.
II Price variable.
At variable prices, a price decrease should not be profitable
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a~i
ap - m(px'fy-Rx') - m(A-2BpfsB) ~ 0
This implies
P ~ 2(B}~)
If we choose the parameters as indicated in table II we have
p ~ 500,5.
Note that in this example selling costs are very large in
relation to production costs.
Table II
p x v m y.i PYi fi si
a~i
dp
700,5 300 2100 45 6,66 4665,33 103,33 4558,4 ~ 0
600,5 400 2400 48 8,33 5002,17 106,16 4893,8 ~ 0
500,5 500 2500 50 10
400,5 600 2400 48 12,5
300,5 700 2100 45 15,5
200,5 800 1600 40 20
100,5 900 900 30 30
50,5 950 475 21 45,3
20,5 980 196 14 70









A- 1000,5; B- 1; a- 100, S- 1~2
EXAMPLE 3.
Non symmetrical solution in the case of identical firms and
selling expenses.
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Demand function: x--32 p} 326;









and after substituting yi - mx, it follows
m ~ Px- fpx}p-p
Choose p- i0, then x- 41 and we find m ~ 11. For m- 11, we
find, applying (12.6), si - 5' -
However, assume that there are 9(type A) firms having output
4, and 1(type B) firm, having, output 2; this also is an
equilibrium, if sA - 5 and sB - 5: with SB - 58, equation
(12.5) is fullfilled
p-f'(2) - xl zSB - 0
(x-2)
Now ~D - 0 and ~~ 0. This is also a solution for variableA B
prices, since
aPA ~ 0 and aPB - 0 at P- lÓ
(Other solutions: 7 type A firms an 2 type B firms, etc.).
13. FINAL REMARKS.
1) The most interesting conclusion from our two models seems
to be, that the solution is highly indeterminate, in the
sense that many equilibria can occur and these are more or
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less stable, once they exist.
In the no-selling costs case the number of firms is adjusted
to the price. In the case of selling costs these are blown
up, using a large part of gross profits, in such a way
that each firm's total marginal costs become at least
locally increasing.
Selling costs may serve to "convexify" the total cost
function.
2) The appropriateness of the Nash Equilibrium as an equilibrium
concept for the present models may be questioned. An extreme
alternative would be to assume that only a single firm can
survive, e.g. by a merger of all active firms. The
monopolist of this case would have to set a price and make
selling expenses so as to exclude profitable entry. This
solution is one of the Nash equilibria considered. Further
there is room for different forms of cooperation between
both active and sleeping firms, e.g. cooperative price
increases and cooperative reductions of selling expenses.
3) The case of fixed prices may be applied to the case of
resale price maintenance. Let the firms be resalers, selling
a single commodity or a basket of commodities, at prices
determined by the producers. Suppose that the resalers
have decreasing mean and marginal costs with respect to
the quantity sold.
If the resalers have no selling costs, then our model tells
us, that the number of firms will adapt to the fixed price,
in such a way that nobody will make more then a small
profit.
If there are possibilities to increase one's market share
by selling activity then fírms will "advertise away" most
of their gross profits and also the number of firms will
be adapted to the fixed prices. In both cases it is possible
that prices are "too" high, i.e. either the fixed price is
above the restricted monopoly price, or at free prices new
firms will enter at lower prices.
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4) Note that in the present paper equilibrium solutions are
described, not the way in which an equilibrium is attained.
There is an equilibrium if and only if no firm has an
incentive to change the price or his selling expenses or
to leave or enter the market. If there is no equilibrium,
then an adjustment process will go on, which will end, if
it ends at all, in an equilibrium. Where it ends depends
on the starting position and on the character of the
adjustment process.
It is also possible that the way in which the adjustment
process develops, gives rise to a change of the model, e.g.
by government regulations or by the creation of cooperation.
5) A disequilibrium could originate from an equilibrium where
a price increase of inputs occurs (inflation), which causes
that some or all firms make a loss. Within the framework
of our models, no firms can increase the price of the
output. So as a consequence of price rigidity, some firms
will have to leave the market, from which a new equilibrium
may result. Of course it is also possible that a cooperative
price increase is organized by all active firms; this may
also result in a Nash equilibrium provided that the price
is not increased so much as to provoke entry.
6) The assumption of decreasing mean costs at any level, may
seem very strong. However if inean costs start increasing
at a very high level, higher than total demand, this
certainly will give the same result.
It seems however that the theory developed in this paper
is also applicable if the cost function is a tradítional
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